Fitz de Souza was one of the lawyers who defended Jomo Kenyatta and his five co-defenders in Kapenguria. Along with fellow Goan Pio Gama Pinto, de Souza was among the very few non-African members of the Kenya African Union (KAU). Fitz later became the Deputy Speaker of Kenya’s National Assembly and a reported favorite of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta. In the book’s
Preface, Hillary Ngweno writes that Fitz had a “
penchant for socialist rhetoric that seemed to make Parkland Asian businessmen and voters uneasy.” However, his socialist leanings did not prevent him from becoming “
the first Kenyan of ‘pure’ Asian descent to get elected to independent Kenya’s first Parliament” as MP for Parklands (pviii)
That another Asian/Indian, alongside Pinto, and Achhroo Ram Kapila were involved in defending Africans fighting for their independence only confirms the assertion made by Shiraz Duranni (
Pio Gama Pinto: Kenya’s Unsung Martyr) and Mansood Ladha (
Memoirs of a Muhindi) that Asians/Indians were front and center in Kenya’s fight for independence but have not received the recognition.
Forward to Independence: My Memoirs is de Souza’s accounting of his life – one marred by the tragedy of losing two colleagues on the opposite end of the ruling party’s (KANU) ideological divide – Pio Gama Pinto and Tom Mboya – both felled by bullets from assassins reportedly linked to the government led by the very man the barrister successfully represented in court.
As Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Fitzval Remedios Santana Neville de Souza tried mediating the ideological struggle between the left-leaning wing of KANU that included Oginga Odinga and the conservative wing that included Tom Mboya. Making matters worse for Fitz is the fact that his friend Pinto, someone he refers to as an “
idealist,” was aligned with Jaramogi on the left.
Leading up to Pinto’s assassination on February 25, 1965, Fitz alluded to the nagging presence around Pio, of “
a pleasant well-spoken gentleman whose official role was that of Labour Officer at the American Embassy” who “
was not what he appeared.” (p249) According to de Souza, the man who he saw “
meeting regularly with Pinto” was “
CIA.” The writer thus wondered “
what the hell Pio was doing” associating with him. de Souza’s concerns arose from the strong influence US had in Kenya – especially “
behind the scene.”
Separate but related, de Souza writes that his friend was “
increasingly vexed about the land bought from the Europeans as part of the independence deal.” Echoing a sentiment that is now common knowledge across the country and the continent, “
a chosen few, mainly Kikuyu, now seemed to be getting lots of it (land) while so many other Africans remained poor and unemployed.” (p250)
Equally telling is the deliberate attempts at co-option the government of the day indulged in. Shortly after discussing the land issue with Pinto, the Commissioner of Lands, Mr. O’Laughlin approached Fitz with a message that “
President Kenyatta says you (Fitz) have to have a farm, that for a thousand pounds, he could get a hundred acres and a gigantic European style house with 10 or 15 rooms and a ballroom with chandeliers.” Fitz argues that “
the land issue must have had a lot to do with” bringing together Gama Pinto and Oginga Odinga and chipping away at the “
respect” he had for Jomo Kenyatta.
The LSE alum narrates a very chilling exchange he had with Tom Mboya as the seminal Sessional Paper 10 was being debated. Briefly, the paper outlined the newly independent country’s development roadmap; effectively, a mixed economy with state and private sector as a strategy for “
sustained economic growth.” (
A Review of the Challenges to Political and Socio-Economic Development in Kenya by Sifuna, Daniel N.; Oanda, Ibrahim)
Mboya reportedly pointed out the concern on the conservative wing of KANU: That Pio was seen as “trouble, a left-wing firebrand out to oust Kenyatta.” In Mboya’s words, “
certain people” would get rid of Pinto once they realized that the ideals and
uhuru they fought for was not the ideals and
uhuru that was being delivered by Kenyatta and those around him. Mboya argued that the possibility of Jaramogi replacing Kenyatta – thanks primarily to the organizational and mobilization skills of Pio Gama Pinto – made eliminating him a near fait accompli.
“
Take Pinto out and the whole thing (Jaramogi Presidency) collapses like a pack of cards.” (p251) And while Mboya was categorical that he would not “
take part in getting rid of him,” he was equally categorical that “
there were people who would.”
Ironically, it was Joseph Murumbi who convinced Gama Pinto to return to Nairobi from Mombasa because “
he would talk to Kenyatta and sort it all out.” The “
it” in this case was the concern the young journalist/organizer had just expressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs: that Jaramogi had driven him to Mombasa – away from Nairobi “
because it was believed he was in danger.”
Undeterred, Pinto continued to compile a list of farms and land which he believed had “
been stolen from African people by the Government.” The list was part of the information Pio’s group was set to use to counter Mboya’s Sessional Paper 10. This was information that would expose the avarice of Jomo and those around him. Fitz writes that the expectations once this information became public was an “
explosive vote of no confidence against Kenyatta.” (p252) Fitz however cautioning the trade unionist of Kenyatta’s “
firm belief that the fruits of independence should be his" since he had “
sacrificed” and “
struggled,” presumably for Kenya's independence.
Kenyatta’s former lawyer then offered an ominous warning to Pinto. He told him that his former client “
would fight to the death if he had.” He told his friend that to attack him (Jomo) morally would land him, Pinto, on his, Jomo's, “
bad side.”
Shortly after the exchange between the two friends in early February 1965, the two men – Jomo and Pio – eventually confronted each other outside Parliament and exchanged words.
Fitz writes that Pio shouted at Kenyatta that he will “
fix” him and Kenyatta, “
equally incensed” shouted back. The two men, according to the author “
were arguing about the English farms which Pio claimed Kenyatta was grabbing.” In his efforts to calm down and counsel his friend, de Souza cautioned Pinto “
not to shout at Kenyatta again, as Kikuyus rarely forgive someone who becomes their enemy.” He offered a perspective, a bleak one, that is consistent with one I have read elsewhere, that Pio, in the eyes of most Africans, was “
just a Muhindi, perfectly dispensable.” (p252)
The preceding write-up is excerpted from the chapter titled
Assassination of an Idealist. The twenty-paged section is a searing and most valid indictment of Kenya’s first government – in every conceivable way. It is also written in a lawyer’s measured tone and language. If only more people had stood up against the ethos that was taking hold in Kenya then, things may have turned out differently on matters governance and national unity.
Unfortunately, and as now evidenced by the country’s progression since then, the ideals that Africans fought for all but vanished once they took over from the British. The seeds of entitlement, greed, and faux nationalism/patriotism that is now endemic were first planted and nourished back then. It was embodied in the rhetorical and darkly foreboding question Jomo Kenyatta reportedly asked at each meeting:
“
If a man plants a tree, who has the right to claim the fruit of that tree when it has grown?” (p253)